Wednesday, October 4, 2017

Gunfight Anatomy -- The Eric Arnold Incident


On 7 September 2017, Eric Arnold opened fire on police officers after officers stopped him in connection with the murder of Arnold’s former girlfriend and her daughter. Arnold exited his pickup and began firing at officers as he advanced toward them.  His bullets struck two officers, one in his vest and another in the left leg. Police returned fire and Arnold died at the scene.  


One of the first things soldiers learn in basic training is the difference between concealment and cover.  Concealment hides you from visual observation but provides no ballistic protection.  Cover also provides concealment; however, cover provides ballistic protection; in other words, cover stops bullets. The number one rule of a gunfight is don’t get shot and as we see in this video, failing to use cover and standing in the open is a great way to get shot.


In the video, we see police officer standing behind an open door of a police SUV that is parked parallel (as was the police cruiser) to Arnold’s pickup. His lower legs and a significant portion of his upper body is exposed.  As Arnold exits the pickup, he begins walking toward this officer firing as he advances. My analysis of the video indicates that Arnold fired six shots with the 6th shot shattering the window and striking the police officer behind the SUV door in his bullet resistant vest. A bullet that passed through the SUV door or the gap between the door and the vehicle stuck another officer in the left leg. Five police officers fired 36 rounds, hitting Arnold 14 times, at least 10 bullets strike the pavement near Arnold, with the other 12 rounds unaccounted for in the video. Arnold died at the scene. 


Remember, all cover is concealment since it protects you from bullets and hides you from sight; however, concealment is not cover. A concrete wall, a telephone pole, a car’s engine block; these are all things that provide ballistic protection from pistol and many rifle rounds. Concealment however does not stop bullets. Car doors, wooden fences, hollow core doors, window glass, bushes, etc. are all things that are unlikely to stop a bullet.  All concealment does is hide you from sight.

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Friday, September 1, 2017

Gunfight Anatomy -- The Nicolas Sanchez Incident


Sanchez Inadvertently Exposing His Pistol
On February 21, two Roy City police officers responded to a trespassing call at a gas station. A store clerk and a witness inside the store reported that Nicolas Sanchez was acting suspiciously with his car’s engine still running in the parking lot.

The first officer on the scene walked to the convenience store and stood near a curb outside while Sanchez stood several feet away near the business’ open doorway. The second officer to respond exited his vehicle and approached Sanchez and the first officer.


The officers asked Sanchez to come to where they were standing and speak with them. Sanchez asked the officers what he had done and why they wished to speak with him. Moments later, Sanchez moved away from the doorway and put his right hand in his pocket. When the second police officer asked Sanchez to remove his hand from his pocket, Sanchez quickly lifted his sweatshirt revealing that he had a pistol. Sanchez then backed away, turned, and ran away from the officers. (Sanchez probably did not intend to reveal the pistol, but rather to convince the officers that he had no weapon. Revealing the pistol was probably inadvertent; however, the second officer was very observant. The total time that Sanchez’s pistol was visible was less than ½ a second.)


As Sanchez begins to move away from the first officer, he chases Sanchez and grabs him by the back of his hoodie and appears to punch him. The two men fall to the ground. At the same time, the second officer yells, “Let me see your hands, let me see your hands” and then fires his pistol once. There is a brief pause before 15 more shots are heard.


In a written statement provided at a press conference, Roy City Attorney Heather White said the first officer was trying to get Sanchez’s gun away from him during their struggle and at one point, the officer saw Sanchez’s pistol pointing at his face.


The first officer and Sanchez were on the wrestling on ground for about three seconds before he disarmed Sanchez; however, at that moment he heard shots being fired and didn’t know if Sanchez had another weapon (the statement said “shots” however, the video indicates that the second officer fired only one shot).


The first officer then opened fire on Sanchez with the pistol he had taken from him, firing 13 rounds in approximately 2.22 seconds as he backpedaled away from Sanchez. The first officer then fired an additional two shots in .41 and .51 seconds respectively. The entire incident lasted just over a minute.


Attorney White’s statement says Sanchez’s criminal history included assault, battery, robbery, drug possession, possession of stolen property, gang activity, weapons violations, parole violations, unlawful discharge of a weapon at a person from a car, attempted murder and more—it is unclear whether all of these charges resulted in convictions. However, Sanchez admitted that he was a convicted felon, illegally in possession of a firearm in August 2010 after police found guns at his Clearfield, Utah home and in a storage unit on a 3rd party’s business property. Sanchez was sentenced to five years in federal prison and three years of probation.

After Sanchez served his prison time for the Utah gun conviction, a probation officer recommended he be released from supervision two years early. A judge granted the request Jan. 27, 2017. Less than one month later, Sanchez is once again illegally in possession of a concealed pistol and trespassing at a gas station. This time Sanchez’s criminal behavior resulted in his death. See the video of the incident below.

See the full video at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgvWh46ajD0

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Friday, August 18, 2017

Gunfight Anatomy: The Officer Quincy Smith Shooting

“Take your hands out of your pocket!” or some variation of
Malcolm Orr
this phrase remains one of the most frequently repeated commands in law enforcement. Although police officers have been yelling it for years, as we saw in the Scotty Richardson incident and as we see here it is often not the best approach.

One of the first things police officers learn is that a suspect's "hands" pose the greatest threat—indeed they do. When dealing with a suspect, an officer should be acutely aware of the ability, or inability, to see the person's hands to ensure he is not clutching or reaching for a weapon. This is a proper concern and when officers encounter someone with their hands in their pockets the officers should immediately assume an elevated level of awareness.

Such was the case with Malcolm Antwan Orr, 29, on 1 January 2016 in Estill, South Carolina.

Estill, South Carolina police Officer Quincy Smith responded to a suspicious person call at the Charles Party Shop. A clerk told Smith that a man wearing camouflage and a red bandana tried snatching groceries from customers. Smith spotted a man matching that description walking away from the store along Railroad Avenue. Smith drove his patrol car a short distance toward the man, who police later identified as Orr.

Smith parked his patrol car and ordered Orr to stop. Orr refused and continued to walk away from Smith, while holding a cellphone to his ear and keeping his right hand in his jacket pocket. Smith told him to take his hand out of his pocket or Smith would use his Taser. At that point, Orr removed a 9mm handgun from his right pocket and began firing at Officer Smith without taking the phone away from his ear.

Officer Smith was threatening to fire his Taser at Orr when he likely perceived that Orr was removing a pistol from his pocket. As he saw the pistol, the video shows that Officer Smith fired his Taser; however, it is likely that one or both Taser prongs missed—in any event, the Taser had no affect on Orr.

Orr opened fire on officer Smith after Smith fired the Taser firing 3 shots in his initial burst. The first shot hit Officer Smith in the neck, another struck his left arm breaking 2 bones, and a third passed through Smith’s upper torso stopping in his back. As officer Smith rolled away to his right, Orr fired a 4th round and continued shooting 4 more rounds as Officer Smith retreated to his patrol car. Orr fired at least two of the eight rounds as Smith was lying on the ground.

The video of this incident demonstrates the danger in telling a suspect to remove his hands from his pocket in an uncontrolled manner. The suspect’s hand movement is not going to be an indicator of trouble—Officer Smith initiated the movement when he commanded Orr to take his hand out of his pocket. The first opportunity for Smith to see that Orr had a firearm was when it was too late.

The video shows that Officer Smith fired his Taser at Orr 1.267 seconds after the first instant that he could have seen the pistol. Orr opened fire at officer Smith .667 seconds after Smith fired the Taser or 1.934 seconds after he removed the pistol from his pocket. Orr fired his second shot in 0.567 after his first and his third shot 0.367 later. Orr fired his first 3 shots within .933 seconds—very likely much faster that Officer Smith could have drawn his service pistol even if he had not had to drop the Taser and had not been shot. As officer Smith rolled away to his right, Orr fired a 4th round at the 2.733 second mark and continued shooting 4 more rounds as Officer Smith retreated to his patrol car.

Officer Smith stated: “I didn’t draw my firearm because at the time I didn’t think it was warranted, he was just walking away. But unfortunately, I made a mistake and I drew my Taser and he got the upper hand on me.” Officer Smith’s approach was understandable and in many circumstances, would have been the best approach. However, any encounter can turn deadly in an instant as we see here.

Orr continued to walk away ignoring Officer Smith’s commands to stop. I am not a South Carolina legal scholar and offer no legal advice; however, did Orr’s refusal to stop provide justification for Officer Smith to use non-lethal force to gain compliance? If so, Smith’s use of his Taser earlier in the encounter may have prevented Orr’s subsequent deadly assault.

Additionally, Officer Smith was close enough to Orr to deflect his pistol and then attempt a disarm or use his Taser directly on Orr. Clearly, this requires specific training and situational awareness that Officer Smith may not have possessed.

During the course of a career, a police officer will interact with a countless number of individuals who have their hands in their pockets. On the street, simply commanding the individual to remove his hands makes it almost impossible to tell whether he is drawing a weapon or complying with your command until it is too late to react. Controlling the manner in which they remove their hands will give you an advantage and position you to react if they do present a weapon.

Finally, there are several full versions of this video available that contain Officer Smith’s efforts to summon aid and the efforts of bystanders who try to help. Aid was surprisingly slow to arrive and the bystanders stated several times that they did not know how to help. If Officer Smith had a trauma kit in his patrol car or on his person he never mentioned it. At the minimum, carry a QuikClot® Combat Gauze®, a combat tourniquet, and a 4" Israeli Emergency Bandage on your equipment belt and a more complete kit in the patrol car.

The video of the incident is available HERE 


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Tuesday, July 4, 2017

Gunfight Analysis: The Miami Grow House Incident


Click Here for the Gunfight Video Analysis
Click Here for the Gunfight Video Analysis
** Warning: Graphic Pictures and Video. For Education Purposes Only**

Research has shown that the only shot that will instantly stop a fight is one that destroys the brain or severs the spinal cord thereby disabling the central nervous system. Shots that do not strike the central nervous system must rely on a critical level of blood loss to cause unconsciousness. Often someone who has received a fatal wound (or wounds) that reduces blood circulation will still be capable of purposeful activity for ten seconds or longer because the brain can remain sufficiently oxygenated. In other words, even if you inflict a fatal wound, your assailant may have a significant period of time in which they can still injure or kill you. There are many documented instances where someone continued fighting for much more than ten seconds after taking a serious wound to the heart or multiple wounds. 


In a gunfight involving Gerardo Delgado (the apparent operator of a marijuana grow house in Miami, FL) and police, Delgado opens fire on police as he emerges from a vehicle in the driveway of the grow house. The video shows several Miami Police Officers and an FBI Special Agent approaching Delgado’s grow house to conduct a “Knock and Talk.” You’ll notice that the first 2 officers pass Delgado who is seated in the car without even a glance; FBI Agent Raul Perdomo positions himself in the front of the house also without taking apparent notice of Delgado in the car. Delgado initiates the gunfight when he steps out of the car and points his pistol at Agent Perdomo to his immediate front—this is the first warning the officers have of his presence. 


Agent Perdomo initially sees that Delgado is armed and (based upon court testimony) yells for Delgado (who is pointing his pistol at him) to “put the gun down.” Agent Perdomo draws his pistol approximately 2 seconds after he sees Delgado and fires as he side steps to his left. From the video angle, it appears that his shot hit the tree.  Agent Perdomo then begins side stepping to his right as he continues to fire. 


Agent Perdomo’s shout alerted Detective John Saavedra who draws his pistol and opens fire on Delgado (approximately 2 seconds after Delgado exits the car). Detective Saavedra fires 5 shots in approximately 2.57 seconds and makes at least two probably fatal hits on Delgado from a distance of approximately 5 yards. Saavedra’s second shot likely hits Delgado center chest and exits his back without severing the spinal cord (see picture #1). 
 
Detective Saavedra's 2nd Shot
 
Delgado’s pistol was still pointed toward Perdomo as Saavedra opened fire; however, the video shows Delgado was transitioning his aim to Saavedra. As Delgado winces from the center chest hit he twists to his left. At that moment (four seconds into the gunfight), Saavedra fires a fourth round which enters and travels laterally through Delgado’s upper right side and exits his left side (see picture #2). 

Detective Saavedra's 4th Shot

This lateral wound subsequently exhibits a great deal of blood loss in a short period of time (see picture 3 which shows evidence of both exit wounds). Delgado physically reacts to the impact of both shots by hunching or wincing.

Delgado Experiencing Blood Loss
 
Approximately one second after taking two probably fatal hits, Delgado opens fire on Saavedra (for approximately 2 seconds). This is the first moment that Saavedra begins to move.  As he moves in a straight line away from Delgado, Delgado fires at least 3 rounds (difficult to tell in the video due to shadow) and hits Saavedra three times, one enters a gap in his vest as Saavedra turns away to his left, others hit him in the groin and thigh. Saavedra continues to fire as well although these shots are not aimed fire shooting what appears to be a total of 7 rounds. One (possibly both) of these shots likely pass close to Agent Perdomo as he moves away. 

Agent Perdomo reacts to these shots and takes aim at Saavedra; however, realizing it is Detective Saavedra he shifts his aim and continues to fire at Delgado who is essentially hidden behind the tree from 6-7 yards away.  Agent Perdomo then takes cover behind the red pickup in which Miami-Dade Detective Jorge Milan had just arrived as the gunfight started. Detective Milan has exited the pickup and taken cover behind it approximately 20 yards from Delgado’s position.


Delgado remains on his feet after firing at Saavedra and continues purposeful activity for an additional 14 seconds until Detective Milan fires a shot through a narrow “V” notch in the tree branches striking Delgado in the head and inflicting the stopping wound. Shortly before the head shot, you can clearly see that Delgado appears to be slowing down as a result of blood loss.1

Detective Milan Fires the Gunfight's Final Round

Dr. Ken Newgard, M.D2 stated that instantaneous neutralization is impossible with non-central nervous system wounds; that a gunshot wound to the thoracic aorta (such as that Delgado may have suffered) would cause blood loss and relatively fast incapacitation. However, Dr. Newgard’s analysis of case studies showed that even if the thoracic aorta were totally severed, it would likely take at least 4-6 seconds to suffer sufficient blood loss to cause unconsciousness. Vasoconstriction resulting from adrenalin dump, amphetamines, antihistamines, cocaine, or other drugs can mitigate this wounding effect and the assailant may remain capable of purposeful action for a much longer period. Delgado in this incident fired at least 3 shots after he had suffered two probably fatal circulatory and respiratory wounds. 


The man who takes the initiative gets to start the fight—all he requires is decisiveness, marksmanship, and the will to kill. Delgado had the initiative in this fight and his attack as well as the physical environment dictated the officer’s tactics. Saavedra faced a reactive event where the bad guy was already preparing to shoot him. Although he successfully drew and fired before Delgado began firing at him, Saavedra’s shots were not immediately effective--unfortunately no pistol round is guaranteed to be immediately effective.


Studies and countless OIS videos have shown that the initial reaction of many officers who are facing a lethal threat is to stand flat-footed, draw, and try to return fire—this is how most departments train their officers—stand and deliver. Square range training often conditions officers to respond to lethal threats presented at close range in this manner. However, to effectively respond using stand and deliver to beat your assailant, you will have to be at least twice as fast as the bad guy and hit the central nervous system—a daunting task.


Saavedra ’s options for direction of movement are all poor, particularly as Agent Perdomo’s shots are impacting on the tree and ground near Delgado. If Saavedra had moved laterally to his left he would have moved directly into Agent Perdomo’s line of fire.  Sometimes there are simply no good choices. Saavedra’s only viable option would have been to aim for a central nervous system shot when Delgado did not go down immediately with his first shots.

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1 The video frame rate or frames per second (fps) of available copies of the incident videos (30 fps) is clearly not the frame rate of the original recording (which was likely either 5 or 7.5 FPS) and the resolution of the various cameras is different. Unfortunately, as a result the, precise timing is problematic; however, the times are very close since there are time stamps on the videos. 


2 Newgard, Ken, M.D.: "The Physiological Effects of Handgun Bullets: The Mechanisms of Wounding and Incapacitation." Wound Ballistics Review, 1(3): 12-17; 1992.


3 Vasoconstriction is the narrowing of the blood vessels resulting from contraction of the muscular wall of the vessels, in particular the large arteries and small arterioles.

Saturday, June 24, 2017

Gunfight Analysis: The Murder of Officer Scotty Richardson

Stephon Carter
“Let me see your hands!” or some variation of this phrase is one of the most frequently repeated commands in law enforcement. Although police officers have been yelling it for years, it may not always be the best approach.

One of the first things police officers learn is that a suspect's "hands" pose the greatest threat—indeed they do. When dealing with a suspect, an officer should be acutely aware of the ability, or inability, to see the person's hands to ensure he or she is not clutching or reaching for a weapon. This is a proper concern and when officers encounter someone with their hands in their pockets the officers should immediately assume an elevated level of awareness.


Such was the case with Stephon Carter, the night of December 20, 2011. 


Aiken, South Carolina Public Safety Officer Travis Griffin responded to a drive-by shooting about 9:30 p.m. and a short time later saw a black Chevrolet Impala similar to the car witnesses said was involved in the shooting. Griffin followed the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop in the parking lot of a near-by apartment complex. Four other officers arrived as backup at the scene including Officer Edward Scott (Scotty) Richardson, who parked his patrol vehicle behind Griffin. 

Griffin asked the front-seat passenger Stephon Carter to exit the vehicle and walk to the rear of the car. Initially Carter had both hands out of his pocket; however, as he came around to the rear of the Impala Carter placed his right hand in his pocket. Griffin asked Carter to remove his hand from his pocket, at which point Carter pulled out a revolver and began firing at the officers.


Carter’s first shot struck Griffin in the chest; however, his bullet resistant vest stopped the round. Carter continued to fire as he turned to his left firing a second shot which missed Griffin’s head and at least one more shot before fleeing the scene. Two of Carter’s shots fatally struck Officer Richardson—one in his left side and one in the head. 


The video of this incident demonstrates the danger in telling a suspect to remove his hands from his pocket in an uncontrolled manner. The suspect’s hand movement is not going to be an indicator of trouble—Officer Griffin initiated the movement when he requested Carter to take his hand out of his pocket. The first opportunity for Griffin to see that Carter had a firearm was when it was too late. . . when Carter fired his first shot into Griffin’s chest. 

Carter firing at Officer Griffin

From the moment Griffin could have seen Carter's revolver until he fired was 0.33 seconds. 


Video analysis shows that from the moment Griffin could have seen that Carter had a revolver in his hand until Carter fired the first shot was 0.33 seconds. Figure 1 shows the first moment that Griffin could see that Carter had something in his hand. Although you can see Griffin is looking at Carter’s hand, Griffin did not react until after Carter fired (figure 2). In truth, he could not have reacted in time—it was not humanly possible.

 

The Force Science Institute conducted several experiments in a 2014 study to measure police officer reaction time to start and stop shooting. In experiment one the officers were positioned in a firing stance with a training pistol and were instructed to fire the pistol when a green light came on for 0.5 sec. On average, it took officers .25 sec to begin the trigger pull (i.e. react to the stimulus) and .06 sec to complete the trigger pull (defined as the actual travel time of the trigger from a position of rest to a position back against the frame) for a total reaction time of .31 sec.1 So even if Griffin was in a firing stance, finger off the trigger, with his pistol aimed at Carter, it would have been almost impossible for Griffin to have reacted to Carter’s movement in time. 

Carter fired his second shot .57 sec later as he was spinning to his left and at least one more shot which the video did not capture. The first officer to draw and fire at Carter does so at 2.7 seconds into the incident; given the circumstances, a credible reaction time. 


Is there a more effective tactic to effectively replace the command, one which improves the officer’s position of advantage while placing the suspect at a disadvantage? I believe so. First, issue the command: “DO NOT take your hands out of your pockets.” Followed immediately with a repeat of the command “DO NOT” to emphasize that you do not want the individual to remove his hands. Many suspects with prior police encounters will automatically begin removing their hands the instant they hear “hands” and “pockets.” 


Command the individual to face away from you and to not look back. After the individual turns facing away, leave your original position and move several steps to the right (or left as the situation dictates). If the suspect was to suddenly turn with a weapon, he would do so anticipating that you would be where he last saw you. 


Command the individual to slowly take his right hand out of his pocket and hold it away from his body, spreading his fingers and turning his palm toward you. Once you see an empty right hand, quietly move again so the next time the individual hears your voice you are in a different position. Instruct the individual to slowly remove his left hand from his pocket and hold it in the same position as the right hand. You may now take additional steps to ensure the individual does not possess a weapon.

At night you can use a similar tactic; however, modern high intensity flashlights help. After you issue the command “DO NOT take your hands out of your pockets” and repeat “DO NOT,” shine your light in the individual’s eyes using the FBI technique (see figure 3) and command him to face away from you and to not look back. After the individual turns facing away, leave your light on him and move several steps to the right (or left as the situation dictates). If the suspect was to suddenly turn with a weapon, he will likely shoot where the light is located. Continue to issue commands and take additional steps to ensure the individual does not possess a weapon as discussed above.

During the course of a career, a police officer will interact with a countless number of individuals who have their hands in their pockets. On the street, simply commanding the individual to remove his hands makes it almost impossible to tell whether he is drawing a weapon or complying with your command until it is too late to react. Controlling the manner in which they remove their hands will give you an advantage and position you to react if they do present a weapon. 



The video of the incident is available at the following link: Officer Richardson Shooting
 
1 Lewinski, Hudson, & Dysterheft (2014). Police Officer Reaction Time to Start and Stop Shooting: The Influence of Decision-Making and Pattern Recognition. Law Enforcement Executive Forum 14(2), 1-16

2 Although the picture shows a drawn handgun, you can do this technique with your hand on a holstered or ready pistol as well. Photo credit: Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission, Level I Handgun Instructor Course, 2008
 

Tuesday, May 30, 2017

Thug Burglars: Tunnel Vision and Stress

Sometimes during a dangerous or life-threatening situation it simply becomes impossible for you to attend to all the stimuli coming at you simultaneously. A temporary blindness or deafness effect can take place as a result. A variety of factors that include high levels of adrenaline in the body from stress or anger cause inattentional blindness--a temporary loss of peripheral vision, also referred to as temporary tunnel vision. Inattentional blindness is a psychological lack of visual perception that is not associated with any vision defects or deficits. Inattentional deafness is a similar phenomenon that affects hearing and is not associated with any hearing defects or deficits.

Everyone’s reaction to a life-threatening situation will be somewhat unpredictable. Although many accounts of a traumatic incident have similarities, no two are the same. People working in the military, police, fire, or medical fields have experienced numerous sensory distortions including tunnel vision while under stress. If you are not aware that you could experience the world in such a bizarre way, it could add to your stress levels.

“I told the SWAT team that the suspect was firing at me from down a long dark hallway about 40 feet long. When I went back to the scene the next day, I was shocked to discover that he had actually been only about 5 feet in front of me in an open room. There was no dark hallway.” 1


In this article, I focus on these sensory distortions--tunnel vision and tunnel hearing.

Tunnel vision can result from the combination of a fear-induced adrenaline dump associated with a specific, dangerous threat. Because kind of danger you have to be in to experience a fear-induced adrenaline rush isn’t something we can practice in a safe training environment, it is important to study the symptoms so we can recognize them when they occur.


Researchers at Johns Hopkins University ran a series of tests on human subjects with a goal of measuring the loss of visual acuity while engaging them in activities designed to narrow attention. The experiment was designed to cause tunnel vision—and it did. However, while the subjects experienced tunneled vision, they also experienced decreased auditory attention (tunnel hearing?). 

Researchers discovered that visually focusing on something intently led the audio cortex to turn down the volume as well. According to Drs. Yantis and Shomstein: "Our findings support several conclusions. First attention affects early visual and auditory  sensory responses. The “push-pull” effect of switching attention between vision and hearing suggests that focusing attention on auditory input (e.g., a cellular telephone conversation) can impair the ability to detect important visual events (e.g., driving an automobile). When attention is directed to the visual system the strength of audial attention is compromised (and vice versa) leading to potentially significant behavioral impairments." In other words, a person intently focused on something visual could have diminished hearing. 2 Conversely, a person intently listening to audible cues such as a radio or cell phone could have diminished visual performance. 

Look at the sequence of pictures below. In this incident, 3 armed individuals invade a home. As they are searching through the house, they awaken a woman who steps into a doorway. One of the home invaders notices the woman (white hat & jacket), points his pistol at her, and begins moving toward her. She opens fire with her pistol. Surprise! 



Invaders #1 & #2 immediately begin scrambling to escape through the door they kicked in to gain entry. The woman advances toward the escaping home invaders and fires another shot. As she does this, home invader #3 comes running out of a hallway to the woman’s left with his pistol pointed toward her (see movement 1). As he careens past, at one point his pistol is pointed toward her head while her pistol is simultaneously pointed at him (movement 2). Their arms collide as invader #3 continues runningdeflecting both pistols—neither fire (movement 3).  



Invader #3 continues running toward the back door (movement 4) while she continues advancing and shooting at invaders #1 & #2 who are firing back at her without even glancing at invader #3 (movement 5)




Based on the video, I believe the woman and invader #3 were both experiencing tunnel vision. I doubt they even noticed each other at all.  She was focusing on the two invaders to her front who were also shooting at her and invader #3 was fixated on escaping (he ran through the glass door at the rear of the kitchen). The video is available here: Home Invasion

These psychological and physiological reactions to dangerous events have worked very well to ensure the survival of our species. Maintaining an intense and narrow visual focus on a cave lion spotted in the brush may have been a very good survival mechanism for the early modern human. Individuals with these traits survived encounters with wild animals and their families benefited from the increased safety in the immediate environment and more protein available in their diet. This increased their chance of passing their genes onto modern humans. 

So, are we are stuck with a genetic predisposition that prevents us from dealing with dangerous modern emergencies? No, because we can learn, remember, adopt and practice a plan to deal with emergencies. As a young paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne Division, I once had a double inversion malfunction during a jump. That basically means you have very little canopy to slow your fall. I remember looking up and seeing other jumpers with small parachute canopies in a line on either side high above me. Without hesitation, I immediately deployed my reserve parachute. Good Army training.



Training and practice pay benefits. Going through any simple series of motions causes the neurons in your brain that control that movement to fire in a particular sequence. The Army pounded emergency malfunction drills into our pea brains through repeated training and repetition. The more often you repeat a physical sequence, the more “automatic” the sequence becomes. Just thinking about making those movements stimulates both the neurons in the brain that control those movements as well as the neural pathways in the muscles that command the muscles to move. Research has shown that visualizing emergency procedures is almost as good as actually performing them. 

The first step in dealing with narrowing attention is understanding that it can happen as your stress level rises and your body does an adrenaline dump in response. Being able to control your stress is one of the best ways to combat the ill-effects of the hormonal chemical dump that changes your psychological, cognitive, and physical performance. Breathing techniques are very effective if you have time. If you find you are fixating on one sound or one task, make a conscious effort to unlock your senses from it and force yourself to scan your environment. It may also help combat the effects of tunneled senses if you ask yourself: What am I missing?

Look at the video at the link below. The gentleman in the black shirt with a white stripe on the shoulder is an off-duty police officer who chooses to engage a robbery team at a supermarket. The wisdom of engaging in a gunfight with numerous children in the vicinity notwithstanding, the officer does not become so fixated on the bad guys to his front that he fails to notice shots coming from behind him. In other words, he does not succumb to tunnel vision nor tunnel hearing. He immediately moves to a cover position and confronts the threat behind him in response to the unexpected sound of shots to his rear (at the 24 second mark in the video). Another example of good training. Supermarket video: Supermarket


Practicing reactions to emergencies increases our confidence and increased confidence lowers the stress response of our bodies when we actually face dangerous situations. Our field of vision is not as narrow as it might be otherwise and our tendency to fixate on a “fear object” diminishes. Because our brain is in a more relaxed state, it is more able to dedicate resources to creatively addressing new challenges (for example, incoming gunfire from an unexpected direction). If we practice the right thing instead of simply allowing our natural reactions to rule the situation we are better able to successfully manage our behavior. 

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1 Anecdotal statement from a Law Enforcement Officer. Perceptual and Memory Distortion During Officer-Involved Shootings by Alexis Artwohl, Ph.D. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 2002/18 

2 Control of Attention Shifts between Vision and Audition in Human Cortex, Sarah Shomstein and Steven Yantis Journal of Neuroscience 24 November 2004, 24 (47) 10702-10706